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APPLYING THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD'S
MARGIN LENDING RULES TO RESTRICT THE USE OF
JUNK BONDS IN HOSTILE CORPORATE TAKEOVERS
High yield bonds, more commonly referred to as junk bonds, are high
yield, below-investment-grade corporate securities.' Junk bonds offer inves-
tors a high yield or high rate of return in exchange for exposure to a higher
risk of default than the risk of default associated with investment-grade
bonds. 2 The below-investment-grade rating assigned to high yield bonds by
1. See The Financing of Mergers and Acquisitions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Domestic Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 246 (1985) (supplemented by Winch and Braucato, Role of High Yield Bonds
(Junk Bonds) in Capital Markets and Corporate Takeovers: Public Policy Implications 246,
254-58 (microfiche) (April 20, 1985) (defining and discussing junk bonds)) [hereinafter cited as
Junk Bonds]; The Financing of Mergers and Acquisitions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Domestic Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 371 (1985) (supplemented by Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., High Yield Bonds
371, 373-75 (microfiche) (April 24, 1985) (defining and discussing junk bonds)) [hereinafter
cited as High Yield Bonds]; Joehnk, An Introduction to Fixed Income Securities, in THE
HANDBOOK OF FixE INCOME SECURITES 3, 9 n.6 (1983) (defining and discussing junk bonds);
see also infra notes 18-29 and accompanying text (same). The term below-investment-grade
derives from the ratings assigned to bonds by Moody's and Standard & Poor's, the major bond
rating agencies. See Junk Bonds, supra, at 254 (discussing bond rating procedure). Moody's
and Standard & Poor's assign ratings to corporate bonds based on an analysis of the credit
worthiness of the company. Id. For example, the bond ratings assigned by Standard & Poor's
result from an extensive investigation into not only the financial aspects of a company, but also
other key elements of a company's business plan such as the company's objectives, strategies,
and policies. See Hessol, Debt Ratings Revisions: Aftermath of Mergers, MERGERS AND
AcQuisrrioNs, 42 (1985) (cited in Junk Bonds, supra, at 255). Standard & Poor's assesses bonds
on a scale descending from AAA to AA to A to BBB to BB to B to CCC to CC to C to D.
See STANDARD & POOR'S BOND GUIDE, Jan. 1986, at 10 (explanation of bond ratings). A AAA
rating designates bonds of the best quality, involving the smallest degree of investment risk. Id.
At the lower end of the scale, D-rated bonds represent the lowest rated class of bonds. Id.
Ratings decline with the bond analysts' view of the issuing company's ability to pay interest
and repay principal. See Junk Bonds, supra, at 254 (explaining bond ratings). Similarly, Moody's
Ratings provide investors with a system to evaluate the relative investment qualities of bonds.
See MOODY'S BOND RECORD, Jan., 1986, at 1 (explanation of bond ratings). The scale of
Moody's descends from Aaa to Aa to A to Baa to B to Cac to Ca to C. Id. Below-investment-
grade bonds are those bonds rated below Baa by Moody's and below BBB by Standard &
Poor's. See Junk Bonds, supra, at 254 (explaining meaning of bond ratings). Junk Bonds,
therefore, are bonds that receive no rating or bonds that receive ratings below Baa from
Moody's or BBB from Standard & Poor's. Id.
2. See Introduction, supra note I, at 9 n.6 (explaining high yield and high risk exposure
associated with junk bonds); supra note 1 (explaining that bond's rating is reflective of degree
of risk associated with that bond). See generally D. DuasT, THE COMPLETE BOND BooK 22-28
(1975) (discussing yield and explaining formulas used in calculating yield). Most of the yield,
or return, on junk bonds takes the form of interest payments. See Latest Developments In
Takeovers, Financing Methods Analyzed By Experts, [July-Dec.] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
No. 44, 1973 (Nov. 8, 1985) (discussing high rates of return on junk bonds) [hereinafter cited
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the major bond rating agencies3 reflects the bond analysts' doubt concerning
the issuer's ability to pay interest and, eventually, repay the principal to the
investor. 4 Currently, junk bonds are most visible as a means of financing
as Latest Developments].
Notwithstanding the high risk exposure associated with high yield bonds, studies reveal
that, as compared to government or investment-grade bonds, the return on high yield bonds
has more than offset high yield bonds' greater risk of default. See High Yield Bonds, supra
note 1, at 384 (describing high net returns received by investors in junk bonds). For example,
Marshall E. Blume and Donald B. Keim conducted a study of the risk and return characteristics
of lower-grade corporate bonds for The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.
See The Financing of Mergers and Acquisitions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic
Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 298 (1985) (supplemented by Blume and Keim, Risk and Return Characteristics of
Lower Grade Bonds 298, 299 (microfiche)) (Dec. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Risk and Return
Characteristics]. Blume and Keim observed that during the period from January 1982 through
May 1984, the annual rate of return on lower-quality bonds was 20.3% as compared to 15.0%
on high-rated AAA bonds. Id. at 301-02; see supra note 1 (explaining meaning of bond ratings).
Blume and Keim, therefore, concluded that from January 1980 through June 1984, in a well-
diversified portfolio, lower-quality bonds posed no greater risk than higher-quality bonds. Risk
and Return Characteristics, supra, at 305. Blume and Keim, however, warned against predicting
similar results for the future because of the short time period involved in their study. Id.
In addition to the Blume and Keim study, Edward I. Altman, Professor of Finance and
Chairman of the MBA Program at New York University, and Scott A. Nammacher, both acting
as consultants for the investment banking firm of Morgan Stanley, conducted a study on the
default rate of high yield bonds. See The Financing of Mergers and Acquisitions: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 335 (1985) (supplemented by E. Altman, and S.
Nammacher, The Default Rate Experience on High Yield Corporate Debt 335, 335-56 (March
1985)) [hereinafter cited as Altman Study]. Altman and Nammacher found that from 1974 to
1984 the default rate on high yield bonds averaged 1.60%. See Altman Study, supra, at 337.
The Altman Study, however, concluded that although a default rate of 1.60% represents an
extremely risky situation, the "returns on low-quality debt portfolios have been very impressive,
even after default." Id. at 337. Moreover, the Altman study explains further that the actual
losses resulting from default are somewhat lower than the default rates simply because defaulted
bonds do not become valueless. 1d.; see High Yield Bonds, supra note I, at 384 (explaining
that default does not mean that bond becomes worthless). Rather than becoming valueless,
defaulted bonds traded at an average rate of 41% of par value shortly following default during
the 1974-84 period. See Altman Study, supra, at 337. See generally Yacik, Roses in the
Junkyard, CREDIr MARKETS, April 8, 1985, at 9 (discussing Altman Study). Additionally,
investors in junk bonds often diversify to reduce the risk of default. High Yield Bonds, supra
note 1, at 385. Through diversification, investors spread the risk of default associated with junk
bonds by investing in several different companies. Id.; see Junk Bonds, supra note 1, at 263
(noting risk-spreading through diversification); Risk and Return Characteristics, supra, at 299
(same).
3. See supra note I (discussing bond ratings).
4. See Joehnk, supra note 1, at 9 n.6 (explaining high risk exposure associated with junk
bonds). Despite the higher risk of default associated with junk bonds, junk bonds comprise a
growing sector of the corporate bond market. See Latest Developments, supra note 2, at 1973
(reporting rapidly growing market for high yield securities). See generally, Fabozzi and Sauvain,
Corporate Bonds, in THE HANDBOOK OF FIXED INcOME SEcurmEs 297 (1983) (defining and
discussing corporate bonds). In addition to straight issues of corporate debt, the high yield
market also includes municipal bonds, preferred stock, high premium convertible bonds, and
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hostile corporate takeovers. 5 To raise the capital necessary to finance an
acquisition, a corporate raider6 creates a shell corporation 7 to issue debt
securities.' A shell corporation has no assets or cash flow to service the debt
created by the issuance of the high yield debt securities. 9 Consequently, if
the corporate raider gains control of the target company, the raider may
liquidate the acquired company's assets to pay the high yield to the purchasers
of the junk bonds.10 Although the issuance of high yield debt securities,
private placements with registration rights. See High Yield Bonds, supra note 1, at 376 (describing
scope of high yield market). A straight bond, as opposed to a convertible bond, is a bond that
an investor cannot convert into another security. See A. PEssIN & F. MArrTLAND, WORDS OF
WALL STREET 249 (1983) (glossary of investment terms). The investment banking firm of Drexel
Burnham Lambert, Inc. (Drexel), a leading underwriter of junk bonds, reports that in the eight
year period from 1977 through 1984, more than 350 companies issued a total of $36.1 billion
of high yield debt. See High Yield Bonds, supra note 1, at 378 (discussing growth of high yield
market); see also Few Jitters About Junk Bonds, FoRrtuNE, April 29, 1985, at 337 (reporting
that in 1984 junk bonds comprised 17% of new corporate bonds issued compared to 3.7% in
1980); Junk Bonds, supra note 1, at 274 (noting that Drexel received credit for underwriting
70% of high yield bonds issued in 1984).
The junk bond market consists primarily of institutional investors. Junk Bonds, supra
note 1, at 273; see Latest Developments, supra note 2, at 1973 (reporting that insurance
companies and pension funds purchase 65-70% of high yield securities offered). Junk bonds
are not a suitable investment for a small individual investor because companies usually issue
junk bonds in face amounts of $25,000 to $100,000. See Junk Bonds Aren't Just For High
Rollers, Bus. WEEK, May 6, 1985, at 141 (describing individuals' role in junk bond market)
[hereinafter cited as High Rollers]. Individuals, however, can participate in the junk bond market
by purchasing shares in mutual funds for as little as $1,000. Id.; see Junk Bonds, supra note
1, at 288 (explaining how individuals participate in high yield bond market through mutual funds
specializing in junk bonds).
5. See FED Board Votes 3-2 to Restrict the Use of 'Junk' Bonds in Corporate Takeovers,
Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1986, at 2, col. 3 (noting popular view of junk bond financing as significant
driving force behind current wave of hostile takeovers) [hereinafter cited as FED Board Votes
3-2]; Scrap Over Junk, TIME, Jan. 20, 1986, at 43 (same); see also infra notes 7-11, 27-40 and
accompanying text (discussing use of junk bonds in financing of hostile corporate takeovers);
cf. Stewart and Hertzberg, The Deal Makers, Investment Bankers Feed a Merger Boom and
Pick Up Fat Fees, Wall St. J., April 2, 1986, at 1, col. 6 (reporting that investment bankers
are cause of takeover boom). Investment bankers receive large fees for underwriting junk bonds
in a hostile acquisition. See Stewart and Hertzberg, supra at 1, col. 6; Schwartz, Junk Bonds
III (pt. 3), INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEsT, Jan. 27, 1986, at 50 (investment banking fees are
high).
6. See Williams, How 'Junk Financings' Aid Corporate Raiders In Hostile Acquisitions,
Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1984, at 1, col. 6 (attaching term corporate raider to purchasers who seek
to acquire companies in hostile takeovers).
7. See A. PEssiN & F. MArrI.AND, WORDS OF WALL STREET 229 (1983) (defining shell
company). A shell company or shell corporation is a corporation usually lacking assets and a
legitimate business operation. Id.; see infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text (describing
creation of and purpose of shell company).
8. See Williams, supra note 6, at 1, col. 6 (explaining junk financing as takeover tactic);
see also infra text accompanying notes 26-32 (explaining use of junk bonds to raise capital to
finance corporate acquisitions).
9. See supra note 7 (defining shell corporation).
10. See Rohatyn, Junk Bonds and Other Securities Swill, Wall St. J., April 18, 1985, at
30, col. 5 (explaining how target company's earnings and assets become vulnerable as sources
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referred to as junk financing, may result in overburdening the acquired
company with debt, junk financing permits a corporate raider to borrow 100
percent of the money necessary to finance the takeover of a target company. "'
On January 8, 1986, however, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (the Board) announced the adoption of an interpretative rule 2 (the
rule) restricting the use of junk bonds in the financing of certain corporate
takeovers.' 3 Specifically, the Board voted to apply the margin lending rules
of Regulation G to debt securities issued by a shell corporation to finance
the acquisition of a target company.' 4 The rule prohibits, in certain situations,
shell corporations from issuing junk bonds in an amount that exceeds fifty
percent of the purchase price of the target company.' 5 The rule, therefore,
imposes restraints on the ability of corporate raiders to obtain the financing
necessary to take over major companies.'
6
Although the rule applies to junk bonds used in hostile corporate
takeovers, junk bonds emerged in the marketplace for a different purpose. 7
The term "junk bonds" referred initially to the bonds of companies that
of payment of return on junk bonds); High Rollers, supra note 4, at 141 (same); Drucker,
Corporate takeovers-what is to be done?, THE PuB. INTERE s, Winter 1986, at 4 (explaining
how hostile takeover forces acquired company to pay for its own execution); see also infra
notes 27-40 and accompanying text (discussing concern surrounding use of junk bonds to
finance hostile corporate takeovers).
11. See Williams, supra note 6, at 1, col. 6 (explaining junk financing as takeover tactic);
see also infra text accompanying notes 27-37 (explaining use of junk bonds to raise capital to
finance corporate acquisitions); Junk Bonds, supra note 1, at 279 (junk financing provides
small entities with financial means to take over large companies).
12. See K. DAVIS, ADmNISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:8 (2d ed. 1979) (defining and
explaining distinction between interpretative rules and legislative rules). An interpretative rule is
a rule issued by an agency without exercising delegated authority to promulgate rules which
have the force of law. See id.; Chamber of Commerce of United States v. Occupational Safety
and Health Admin., 636 F.2d 464, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (defining interpretative rule). A legislative
rule, however, results from an exercise of delegated legislative authority to promulgate rules which
have the force of law. See DAvis, supra, at § 7:8 (defining and explaining distinction between
interpretative rules and legislative rules); Chamber of Commerce, 636 F.2d at 468 (same). An
interpretative rule is an agency's interpretation of an existing statute or rule. Batterton v. Mar-
shall, 648 F.2d 694, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1980). But see General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742
F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (agency action intended to formulate new law, rights, or duties
is legislative rule), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2153 (1985). While not binding on a court, inter-
pretative rules provide guidance to agencies by clarifying statutory language. See Chamber of
Commerce, 636 F.2d at 469 (explaining purpose of interpretative rules).
13. See 51 Fed. Reg. 1771 (Jan. 15, 1986) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 207.112); see
also FED Board Votes 3-1, supra note 5, at 2, col. 3 (interpreting Board's action).
14. See FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,952 (Jan. 22, 1986) (discussing rule); 51 FED. REG.
at 1771 (same); see also 12 C.F.R. § 207.1-207.112 (1985) (margin regulations).
15. 51 Fed. Reg. at 1771; see Volcker Bends a Bit to Get His Junk Bond Rules, Bus.
WEEK, Jan. 20, 1986, at 25 (interpreting Board's actions); see also infra text accompanying
notes 41-51 (explaining operation of rule).
16. 51 Fed. Reg. at 1771; see FED Board Votes 3-2, supra note 5, at 2, col. 3 (noting
that 50% junk financing limit will force raiders to come up with more cash to finance
acquisition); Scrap Over Junk, TIME, Jan. 20, 1986, at 43 (same).
17. See infra notes 18-23 and accompanying text (explaining origin of junk bonds).
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entered the marketplace with investment-grade ratings,' but later began to
experience financial difficulties. 9 As a result of a company's financial
troubles, the major credit rating agencies 0 downgraded the company's
bonds. 21 The investment community refers to a company whose bonds become
downgraded as a fallen angel," and to bonds of the fallen angel as junk.23
In 1977, however, the investment banking firm of Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Inc. (Drexel), introduced a new type of junk bond to the corporate bond
market.24 In 1977, Drexel, as a means of raising capital, began underwriting
and trading bonds issued by small, emerging companies that received below-
investment-grade ratings because of the companies' lack of a credit history.25
The bonds issued by these small, emerging companies, like the bonds of the
fallen angels, acquired the label junk bonds because of the bonds' below-
investment-grade rating. 26 In 1983, Drexel expanded the concept of raising
capital through original issues of junk bonds into the realm of corporate
takeovers. 27 To avoid the difficulty involved in financing hostile corporate
18. See supra note I (explaining meaning of bond ratings).
19. See High Yield Bonds, supra note 1, at 373 (explaining origin of term junk bonds).
20. See supra note I (describing bond rating systems of Moody's and Standard & Poor's).
21. See High Yield Bonds, supra note 1, at 373 (explaining origin of term junk bonds).
22. Id. During the past five years, Ford Motor, Chrysler, and Montgomery Ward fell
into the fallen angel category, but recovered and rose out of the high yield market. Id. at 377.
23. Id. at 373. The investment banking firm of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. (Drexel),
estimates that if all of the United States corporations with assets of more than $25 million
applied for an investment rating, 99% of these corporations would receive below-investment-
grade ratings and the investment community, therefore, would classify the bonds issued by
these corporations as junk. Id. at 375; see supra note 4 (discussing Drexel's role in the junk
bond market); infra notes 24-28, 30-33 and accompanying text (same).
24. See High Yield Bonds, supra note I, at 374-75 (describing Drexel's role in development
of junk bond market); infra text accompanying notes 25-27 (describing emergence of original
issues of high yield, low-rated corporate bonds).
25. See High Yield Bonds, supra note 1, at 374-75 (describing Drexel's role in development
of junk bond market). From an issuer's perspective, junk bonds provide companies with a
means of financing that is more attractive than traditional financing available through banks
and insurance companies. See High Yield Bonds, supra note 1, at 373-76. Drexel explained that
beginning in the late 1970s, companies whose bonds received below-investment-grade ratings turned
to junk bonds to raise permanent capital to avoid the restrictive covenants imposed by banking
institutions and insurance companies. See High Yield Bonds, supra note 1, at 376. Additionally,
Drexel reported that low-rated companies turned away from traditional financing through banks
and insurance companies to become more visible in public markets, and to obtain greater institu-
tional support from creditors. Id.
26. Id. at 375.
27. See High Yield Bonds, supra note 1, at 387-89 (explaining role of junk bonds as
means of financing corporate acquisitions); infra notes 28-40 and accompanying text (same).
Examples of recent takeover transactions involving the use of junk financing include Mesa
Petroleum Company's bid for Unocal Corp., GAF Corp.'s offer for Union Carbide, Pantry
Pride's bid for Revlon, Inc. and most recently, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.'s bid for
MGM/UA Entertainment Co. See FED Adopts Junk-Bond Restrictions, Wash. Post, Jan. 9,
1986 at E9, col. 6 (noting examples of recent takeover bids utilizing junk financing) [hereinafter
cited as FED Adopts]; Schwartz, supra note 5, at 50 (discussing Turner-MGM/UA merger).
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acquisitions through traditional financing methods, corporate raiders turn to
junk financing to raise the capital needed to take over large companies. 2 A
consideration of junk bonds, therefore, requires a distinction between junk
bonds issued by fallen angels and original issues of high yield, low-rated
corporate bonds, largely utilized as a means of raising capital for emerging
companies, and, more recently, as a means of raising capital to finance
hostile corporate acquisitions.29
Under Drexel's system of junk financing, a corporate raider creates a
shell company3 ° to issue junk securities."a The shell company then offers
Drexel's corporate and individual investors the opportunity to buy the new
junk bonds to help finance the takeover. 32 The shell company uses the
proceeds from the sale of the junk bonds to acquire the shares of a target
company."
A shell company formed for the purpose of acquiring the shares of a
target company has no other business operations and, therefore, has no
Described as perhaps the ultimate junk bond financed acquisition, the Turner-MGM/UA merger
was a $1.5 billion transaction with no cash provided by the acquirer. Schwartz, supra note 5,
at 50 (discussing Turner-MGM/UA merger). Drexel arranged the financing for the Turner-
MGM/UA Deal. Id.
28. See High Yield Bonds, supra note 1, at 388 (describing difficulty involved in raising
capital for hostile takeovers through traditional financing techniques); see also Takeovers, supra
note 10, at 8 (reporting that $1.5 billion represents the minimum amount necessary to attack a
large company in a hostile takeover bid). Raising the large sums of money necessary for a
hostile takeover through conventional lending institutions is difficult. See High Yield Bonds,
supra note 1, at 388 (describing difficulty involved in raising capital for hostile takeovers
through traditional financing techniques). Banks, for example, lack the flexibility to tailor
financing features to suit the needs of particular large transactions. Id. Additionally, banks may
refuse to make loans for acquisition activity to avoid the publicity and litigation often associated
with hostile corporate takeovers. Id. at 388-89.
29. See Junk Bonds, supra note I, at 255 (noting distinction between two categories of
junk bonds).
30. See supra note 7 (defining shell corporation).
31. See Williams, supra note 6, at 1, col. 6 (explaining Drexel's system of junk financing
of hostile corporate acquisitions).
32. Id. Drexel's clients include T. Boone Pickens, Jr., Mesa Petroleum Co.'s chairman;
Sir James Goldsmith, a European financier; and Victor Posner of Miami. Id. at 20, col. 2.
Drexel's investors include savings and loan associations, insurance companies, wealthy individ-
uals, trust departments of banks, pension plans, and corporations. Id.
33. See id. at 1, col. 6 (describing role of shell company in corporate acquisitions); 51
Fed. Reg. at 1771 (same). To acquire the target company's shares, the shell company,using the
proceeds from the sale of the junk bonds, offers to buy the target stockholders' shares of the
target company's stock at a price greater than the current market price of the stock. See
Drucker, supra note 10, at 4 (describing how raider acquires target's shares). Stock prices of
target companies tend to rise when the investment community anticipates a takeover. See The
Financing of Mergers and Acquisitions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Monetary
Policy of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 27
(1985) (statement of Preston Martin, Vice Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System). Consequently, even if the takeover bid fails, the corporate raider realizes a profit on
the target company's shares purchased at the lower market price. See Drucker, supra note 10,
at 4 (raider wins big even if takeover attempt is unsuccessful).
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assets or cash flow, other than the margin stock34 the shell company has
acquired or intends to acquire from the target, to support the credit obtained
through the sale of the debt securities." Consequently, once the corporate
raider accomplishes the takeover, the target company becomes responsible
for payment of the high rate of interest to the investors who purchased the
junk bonds to help finance the takeover.16 If the earnings of the target
company are inadequate to meet the high interest rates demanded by the
high yield bonds, the new management must sell the target company's assets
to pay interest to purchasers of the bonds.3 7 The liquidation of the target
company's assets to service the debt created through the issuance of junk
bonds raises serious economic concerns about the use of junk bonds to
finance hostile corporate acquisitions. 8 In addition to economic concerns,
34. See infra note 41 (defining margin stock).
35. See 51 Fed. Reg. at 1771 (describing role of shell company in corporate acquisition).
36. See Rohatyn, supra note 10, at 30, col. 5 (explaining how target company's earnings
and assets become vulnerable as sources of payment of return on junk bonds).
37. Id.; see High Rollers, supra note 4, at 141 (noting that target company's assets become
vulnerable as sources of payment of return on junk bonds).
38. See Rohatyn, supra note 10, at 30, col. 5 (expressing concern over tearing apart of
corporation to service high yield debt); see also Junk Bonds, supra note 1, at 279-80 (citing
Rohatyn's comments as articulation of concern that certain financiers do not engage in corporate
takeover attempts for purpose of furthering best interests of target company). Drexel refutes
the argument that acquisitions financed by junk bonds require a sale of the target's assets to
repay the debt to investors. See High Yield Bonds, supra note I at 389. Drexel asserts that
liquidation of assets may result from a business decision by management to sell certain assets
to enable the company to operate more effectively and competitively. Id. at 389-90. Moreover,
Drexel states that the acquirer may have decided to sell certain assets prior to the acquisition.
Id. at 390.
Another area of concern involves the association of financiers' use of junk financing with
the technique of "greenmail." See Junk Bonds, supra note 1, at 285. Greenmail describes the
process in which a raider threatens a potential target with a junk financed takeover attempt for
the sole purpose of forcing the target to repurchase at a premium the shares of a target company
already owned by the raider. Id. Repurchasing the raider's shares leaves the target in a very
weakened position and suggests that the raider intended to acquire short term profits rather
than the operation of the company. Id. at 279-80; see id. at 277-78 (illustrating association of
junk financing with greenmail). Moreover, combatting a raider's greenmail techniques by
repurchasing the raider's shares at a premium, diverts corporate funds from technological
research and development which may weaken the competitiveness of the United States economy.
See Drucker, supra note 10, at 13 (explaining how defending against hostile takeovers has
become dominant force in corporate management). Consequently, some commentators fear that
the corporate raiders are altering the structure of the American economy by forcing management
to sacrifice long-term, business planning, which includes expenditures for research and devel-
opment, for short-term defensive decisionmaking focused on protecting the company against
hostile takeovers. Id.; cf. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 50 (junk bond issue must be viewed as
part of larger transition occurring in American economy). In response to the growing concern
surrounding the use of junk bonds, several congressmen introduced legislation in the 99th
Congress aimed at junk bonds. See, e.g., H.R. 2476, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (to amend
tax laws related to acquisitions, junk bonds and greenmail); S. 1286, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985) (to limit amount of junk securities federally insured institutions hold); S. 1016, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (to amend Federal Deposit Insurance Act and National Housing Act
with regard to junk bonds).
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the liquidation of a corporation solely to repay debt raises questions of
public policy. 9 The disassembling of a corporation to repay debt overlooks
the interests of the corporation's employees and customers, as well as the
community in which the company operates. 40
Amidst the concern surrounding the use of junk bonds to finance hostile
corporate acquisitions, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(the Board), on January 8, 1986, announced the adoption of an interpretative
rule applying the margin lending rules of Regulation G4' to debt securities
issued by shell companies for the purpose of acquiring the margin stock
42 of
39. See Rohatyn, supra note 10, at 30, col. 5 (raising public policy questions surrounding
tearing apart of corporation to service high yield debt); supra note 36 (discussing concern sur-
rounding junk bonds).
40. See Rohatyn, supra note 10, at 30, col. 5 (raising public policy questions surrounding
tearing apart of corporation to service high yield debt); cf. Sugg, The Threat of Merger Mania,
Roanoke Times & World-News, Feb. 24, 1986, at A 9, col. 3 (concern over takeovers extends
beyond corporate boardroom to plant employees and families whose lives center around plant
floor); W. Baxter, Baxter World Economic Service, 9 (Bulletin 12, March 21, 1986) (discussing
disassembling of going corporation).
41. 12 C.F.R. §208.1-207.12 (1985). The margin lending rules of Regulation G govern the
extension of credit by persons other than banks, brokers or dealers. See 12 C.F.R. §207.1(b)
(1985) (defining purpose and scope of Regulation G); see also A. PEssIN & F. MAITLAND, WORDS
OF WALL STREET 199 (1983) (defining Regulation G). The margin lending rules apply to lenders
who extend credit for the purpose of buying securities when those securities serve as collateral
for the credit extended. See The Financing of Mergers and Acquisitions: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Domestic Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1985) (statement of Preston Martin, Vice Chairman, Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). For purposes of Regulation G, a lender is any
person required to meet the registration requirements of Regulation G. 12 C.F.R. § 207.2(h)
(1985). Under Regulation G, every person who extends or maintains credit in the amount of
$200,000 or more during any calendar quarter that is secured, directly or indirectly, by any
margin stock must register with the Board. Id. at § 207.3(a) (1985). Additionally, a person
whose credit outstanding equals $500,000 or more during that calendar quarter must also
register. Id. The Board concluded that purchasers of debt securities may qualify as lenders
under Regulation G because they buy the debt securities in very substantial quantities. 51 Fed.
Reg. at 1773. Specifically, Regulation G provides that "[n]o lender... shall extend any purpose
credit, secured directly or indirectly by margin stock in an amount that exceeds the maximum
loan value of the collateral securing the credit ... ." 12 C.F.R. § 207.3(b) (1985). Purpose
credit is credit extended for the purpose of buying or carrying margin stock. 12 C.F.R. §
207.2(l) (1985). The Board concluded that the debt securities issued by a shell company clearly
constitute purpose credit under Regulation G. 51 Fed. Reg. at 1773. Section 207.2(b) of
Regulation G describes two situations that fall within the meaning of indirectly secured, including
any arrangement involving a restriction on the disposition of the margin stock. 12 C.F.R. §
207.2(b) (1985). Section 207.2(i) of Regulation G defines margin stock as any equity security
registered or having unlisted trading privileges on a national securities exchange. 12 C.F.R. §
207.2(i) (1985). Under Regulation G "[tihe maximum loan value of any margin stock... is
fifty percent of its current market value." 12 C.F.R. § 207.7(b) (1985). The Board promulgated
Regulation G pursuant to Section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C. §
78g(a) (1982) (providing for regulation of extension of credit); 12 C.F.R. § 207.1(a) (1985)
(citing Section 7 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as authority for Regulation 0). Section 7
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 gives the Board authority to prevent the excessive use
of credit extended for the purchase or carrying of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1982).
42. See supra note 41 (defining margin stock).
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a target company in a takeover attempt.4 3 The Board concluded that debt
securities issued by a shell corporation, for the purpose of acquiring the
margin stock of a target company, are indirectly secured 4 by the margin
stock acquired in the limited situation in which the other assets of the shell
company are insufficient to support the credit extended by the purchasers of
the debt securities s.4  The margin lending rules of Regulation G prohibit a
lender46 from extending purpose credit47 indirectly secured 48 by margin stock
in an amount that exceeds fifty percent of the market value of the collateral
securing the stock. 49 Consequently, the margin lending rules of Regulation
G limit the amount of credit a lender can extend through the purchase of
debt securities to fifty percent of the purchase price of the target company.
50
Regulation G provides further that indirectly secured includes any arrange-
ment with the purchaser involving a restriction on the disposition of the
margin stock.' The Board cited Mesa Petroleum Company's bid for Unocal
Corporation as a situation involving a restriction on the disposition of
margin stock so that the debt securities purchased to finance the acquisition
were indirectly secured by the margin stock for purposes of Regulation G. 52
43. See 51 Fed. Reg. at 1771; see also FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 83,952 (Jan. 22, 1986)
(discussing rule).
44. See supra note 41 (defining indirectly secured).
45. See 51 Fed. Reg. at 1774 (explaining rule). Although the rule speaks generally in terms
of debt securities, and not specifically in terms of junk bonds, the applicability of the rule to
high yield debt securities is clear. See FED Board Votes 3-2, supra note 5, at 2, col. 3
(interpreting Board's action as restriction on use of junk bonds in financing of certain corporate
takeovers); FED Adopts, supra note 27, at El, col. 6 (same); Scrap Over Junk, supra note 5,
at 43 (same). Stated in junk bond terms, the Board concluded that junk bonds issued by a shell
company to purchase the margin stock of a target company are indirectly secured by the margin
stock in the limited situations in which the other assets of the shell company are insufficient to
pay the high interest rates to the purchasers of the junk bonds. See FED Board Votes 3-2,
supra note 5, at 2, col. 3 (interpreting Board's action as restriction on use of junk bonds in
financing of certain corporate takeovers); FED Adopts, supra note 27, at El, col. 6 (same);
Scrap Over Junk, supra note 5, at 43 (same).
46. See supra note 41 (defining lender).
47. See id. (defining purpose credit).
48. See id. (defining indirectly secured).
49. 12 C.F.R. § 207.3(b) (1985); see supra note 41 (explaining Regulation G).
50. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 207.3(b), 207.7(a) (1985) (explaining credit limitations); FED Board
Votes 3-2, supra note 5, at 2, col. 3 (interpreting Board's action as restriction on use of junk
bonds in financing of certain corporate takeovers); FED Adopts Junk-Bond Restrictions, supra
note 27, at El, col. 6 (same); Scrap Over Junk, supra note 5, at 43 (same).
51. See 12 C.F.R. § 207.2(f) (1985) (defining indirectly secured); supra note 41 (same).
52. See 51 Fed. Reg. at 1772 (explaining purpose of rule). The interpretative rule resulted
from petitions submitted to the Board by Unocal Corp. (Unocal) and Revlon, Inc. (Revlon).
See 51 Fed. Reg. at 1771-72 (explaining origin of rule). In May 1985, Unocal requested a
determination that the margin lending restrictions of Regulation G governed the issuance of
debt securities by a shell corporation controlled by Mesa Petroleum Co. to acquire Unocal's
stock. Id. at 1771. Similarly, in September 1985, Revlon requested a determination that the
margin lending restrictions of Regulation G governed Pantry Pride's issuance of debt securities
as part of Pantry Pride's takeover bid for Revlon. Id. at 1772. Additionally, several members
of Congress requested the Board to address the applicability of the margin lending rules to the
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In the Mesa/Unocal transaction, a shell corporation controlled by Mesa
issued debt securities to finance a tender offer for Unocal's stock." The shell
corporation held no assets other than the margin stock acquired from the
target.14 In May, 1985, Unocal requested a determination from the Board
that the debt securities issued by the shell corporation to acquire Unocal's
stock were subject to the margin lending restrictions of Regulation G.11 The
Board observed that opposition to the merger by the target company, Unocal,
could delay or prevent the consummation of the acquisition, forcing the shell
company to hold the stock for a significant period of time.16 The Board
reasoned that during the period of indefinite delay caused by opposition to
the takeover, lenders could rely on only the margin stock, and not the assets
of the target company, for repayment of the credit.17 The Board stated that
a reasonable lender would not extend credit to a shell corporation without
an understanding that the shell corporation would hold the stock during the
period of indefinite delay.-8 The Board reasoned that this understanding
would discourage the shell company from disposing of the stock, thus
constituting a restriction on the shell company's right to dispose of the
stock. 59 The Board, therefore, concluded that the debt securities issued by
the shell company were indirectly secured by the margin stock the shell
company intended to acquire and, therefore, the debt securities were subject
to the margin lending restrictions of Regulation G. 0
The Board, however, emphasized that even if a restriction on the
disposition of the target company's stock exists, the presumption of indirect
security does not arise unless the lender, in good faith, relies on the margin
stock as collateral for repayment of the debt. 6' Consequently, the Board
delineated four situations in which the interpretative rule will not apply
use of debt securities to finance corporate takeover attempts. Id. The Board considered the
requests of Unocal, Revlon, and the legislators in meetings in September and November 1985.
Id. On December 6, 1985, the Board released a proposed interpretation of Regulation G. Id.;
see 50 Fed. Reg. 50606 (Dec. 10, 1985). After issuing the proposed interpretation, the Board
allowed a short period for public comment. 51 Fed. Reg. at 1772. After receiving 87 comments,
the Board adopted the proposal with clarifications and limited modifications. Id. The final
interpretative rule became effective on January 10, 1986. Id. at 1771.
53. 51 Fed. Reg. at 1773 (describing Mesa/Unocal transaction).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1771.
56. Id. at 1773.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.; see 12 C.F.R. § 207.2(f) (1985) (indirectly secured includes any restriction on
borrower's ability to dispose of margin stock).
60. 51 Fed. Reg. at 1773. But see generally The Financing of Mergers and Acquisitions:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 165 (1985) (supplemented by Memorandum
for Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by Davis Polk & Wardwell; Baker &
Botts; Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom 165, 166-67 (microfiche) (April 30, 1985) (advising
Board that Regulation G did not apply to Mesa/Unocal transaction)).
61. 51 Fed. Reg. at 1773.
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because the lender could not rely reasonably on the target company's assets
for repayment. 62 Specifically, the Board's presumption that the debt securities
are indirectly secured by margin stock will not apply if the shell's parent
company, or another company possessing substantial non-margin stock assets
or cash flow, guaranteed the debt securities issued by the shell company.
63
Additionally, the presumption will not apply if a merger agreement existed
between the acquiring and target companies which the parties entered into
at the time investors agreed to purchase the debt securities or at a time
before investors advanced the loan funds.64 Moreover, the presumption will
not apply to short form mergers, 6 or to debt securities issued by an operating
company with sufficient assets to support the debt. 6
The Board's delineation of the numerous situations in which the rule
will not apply is reflective of the narrow scope of the rule.67 The narrow
scope of the rule is indicative of the minimal impact the rule is likely to have
on corporate takeover activity.68 The Board has acknowledged that the rule
will not substantially alter the level of merger activity. 69 The Board empha-
sized that the interpretative rule applies to a very narrowly defined class of
acquisition financing transactions in which shell corporations issue debt
securities.7 0 Although Wall Street's reaction to the Board's action has been
62. Id. at 1772-74.
63. Id. The Board permits lenders to rely in good faith on assets other than margin stock
as collateral for repayment of the credit if the parent company or another company guarantees
the debt securities. Id.
64. Id. at 1773.
65. Id. Short form merger refers to a merger resulting from the shell company's acquisition
of a number of shares necessary pursuant to state law to accomplish a merger without the
approval of the shareholders or directors of the target company. Id.
66. Id. at 1772. In its explanation of the rule, the Board cited the recent Pantry Pride/
Revlon and GAF/Union Carbide transactions as illustrations of situations in which the rule
would not apply. See id. (describing Pantry Pride/Revlon transaction); id. at 1772 n.3 (describing
GAF/Union Carbide transaction). In the Pantry Pride/Revlon transaction, Pantry Pride, an
operating company possessing substantial assets other than margin stock, issued debt securities
to finance a tender offer for Revlon's stock. Id. at 1772. Pantry Pride successfully completed
its acquisition of Revlon after Revlon unsuccessfully attempted a leveraged buy-out of Revlon.
Id. at n.3; see MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1247-52
(Del. Ch. 1985) (Delaware court invalidated Revlon's attempted "friendly" leveraged buy-out),
aff'd, 506 A.2d 173, 180-85 (Del. 1986); 51 Fed. Reg. at 1772 n.3 (discussing Revlon). In GAF's
bid for Union Carbide, OAF, as the parent of the shell company would guarantee either the
debt securities issued by the shell to finance the tender offer for the shares of Union Carbide,
or issue the debt securities itself. 51 Fed. Reg. at 1772 n.2. OAF, however, on January 8, 1986,
abandoned its attempt to takeover Union Carbide. See GAFDrops Bid For Carbide, Wash. Post,
Jan. 9, 1986, at El, col. 6 (detailed coverage of GAF's pursuit of Union Carbide); Schwartz,
Junk Bonds II: Victory in Defeat, INvEsT. DEAT.aRs DGF.sT, Jan. 20, 1986 (discussing GAF's
hostile bid for Union Carbide including financing summary).
67. See 51 Fed. Reg. at 1774 (noting narrow scope of interpretative rule); supra notes 63-
66 and accompanying text (describing situations in which rule would not apply).
68. See infra text accompanying notes 69-71 (explaining that rule will not likely reduce
merger activity).
69. 51 Fed. Reg. at 1776.
70. Id. at 1778.
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mixed, a frequent response is that potential corporate raiders likely will tailor
takeover attacks to conform to the situations described by the Board as not
falling within the applicable scope of the rule, or will devise new ways to
avoid the rule.
7'
Opponents of the Board's action include the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Justice Department, and Drexel.72 Much of the criticism
charges that the Board's action failed to comply with the rulemaking
procedures set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 73 The Board
defended the charges on the ground that the rule was not legislative, but was
merely interpretative and, as such, the Board's action falls within the
exemption from the rulemaking procedures of the APA. 74 The purpose of
the interpretative rule is to guide the investment community in determining
whether debt securities issued to finance the acquisition of the margin stock
of a target company come within the scope of the margin lending restrictions
in Regulation G in certain takeover situations. 7s The rule, therefore, is not
new law, but is the Board's interpretation of the application of an existing
provision of Regulation G in certain takeover situations. 76 The Board con-
cluded that equitable and consistent administration of existing law requires
application of the margin regulations in situations in which purpose credit
extended is indirectly secured by margin stock. 77 Unless successfully chal-
lenged on APA or other grounds, raiders, financiers, and investors involved
in hostile corporate takeover transactions must comply with the Board's
71. See FED Adopts, supra note 27, at El, col. 4 (suggesting that bidders could get
around rule by selling preferred stock rather than debt to finance acquisitions or by having
companies with substantial assets guarantee takeover financing); FED Votes 3-2 to Limit Use
of Junk Bonds, AMERICAN BANKER, Jan. 9, 1986, at 18, col. 4 (reporting suggestion that bidders
might try to avoid label of shell by establishing company with nominal business operations);
see also Scrap Over Junk, supra note 5, at 43 (reporting Drexel's assertion that creativity of
financial sector will avoid rule).
72. See Justice, SEC Criticize Rule on Junk Bonds as Hasty, Costly, SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) No. 1, 3 (Jan. 3, 1986) (commenting on proposed interpretation); 51 Fed. Reg. at
1775-78 (analysis of public comments received on proposed interpretation).
73. See 51 Fed. Reg. at 1778 (discussing charges that rule violates Administrative Procedure
Act). The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) establishes administrative rulemaking guidelines.
See 5 U.S.C. § 551-53 (1982) (regulation of rulemaking procedure). The APA requires an
agency formulating a rule to give notice of the rulemaking, provide for an opportunity for
public comment, state the rule's basis and purpose, and provide a delayed effective date. 5
U.S.C. § 553(a)-(d); see 51 Fed. Reg. at 1778 (interpreting APA). The APA exempts expressly
interpretative rules from the rulemaking regulations. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)(A), (C)(2); see 51 Fed.
Reg. at 1778 (interpreting APA).
74. 51 Fed. Reg. at 1778 (rebutting charge that rule violates APA). The Board concluded
that because the rule is interpretative, the Board does not intend the rule as an exercise of the
Board's statutory rulemaking power, as binding on reviewing courts, nor as subject to the APA.
Id. at 1772; see also supra note 12 (distinguishing between legislative and interpretative rules).
75. See 51 Fed. Reg. at 1772 (explaining purpose of rule).
76. See 51 Fed. Reg. at 1779 (Board defending rule as interpretative); supra note 12
(distinguishing between legislative and interpretative rules).
77. 51 Fed. Reg. at 1776.
[Vol. 43:10871098
JUNK BONDS
action restricting the use of junk bonds in certain hostile takeover situations .7
Although corporate raiders will turn away from junk financing or devise
ways of sheltering junk financing from the narrow scope of the rule, the
Board has achieved its modest goal of limiting the issuance of junk bonds
by shell corporations in only specifically defined acquisition situations. 79
Junk financing that falls outside the narrow scope of the rule, however, will
continue to impede the vitality of American corporations by forcing man-
agement to divert funds away from expenditures that increase productivity
and economic competitiveness to service high yield debt. 0 Moreover, as
corporate raiders turn away from junk financing, a further question arises
as to what impact, if any, the rule will have on the junk bond market outside
the realm of corporate takeovers. 81 Since the rule applies only to shell
companies involved in corporate acquisitions it is plausible to assume that
companies that turn to junk financing as a means of raising operating capital




78. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing interpretative rule); supra note
12 (same).
79. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (discussing minimal impact of rule). Felix
Rohatyn, a critic of junk financing of hostile corporate takeovers, praises the Board's action
as "a sound step to curb the most extreme uses of junk bonds." Scrap Over Junk, supra note
5, at 43.
80. See Baxter, supra note 40 (discussing concern surrounding junk bonds).
81. See infra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing impact of rule outside realm of
corporate takeovers).
82. See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text (explaining that companies issue junk
bonds to raise capital); supra note 4 (discussing current growth of junk bond market); cf.
Television interview with Ed Brown, President, Brown Capital Management Company, on Wall
Street Week with Louis Rukeyser, Jan. 17, 1986 (encouraging investors to hold on to junk
bond fund).
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